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Abstract 
This paper presents the process of Chinese outward direct investment in 
Europe. It argues that the driving motive of Chinese firms to go abroad 
aimed at acquiring new skills, advanced technology, brands and supply 
chains that would enhance their competitive advantage in international as 
well as domestic markets. A remarkable feature of the Chinese cross- 
border business expansion is the essential role of government in the 
internationalization of Chinese MNCs which was supported by official 
policy instruments, including the famous “go global” strategy that 
encouraged thousands of Chinese firms to invest abroad. To this end, the 
Chinese investment in Europe has generally targeted few but major 
economies, namely Germany, UK and France despite the investment 
growth in Southern and Central European nations in recent years 
especially after the financial crisis. Merger and acquisitions has been the 
leading market entry mode resulting in huge takeovers characterizing 
Chinese investment in Europe. It is also apparent that the 
internationalization process of Chinese business companies did not follow 
the traditional Uppsala model as psychic distance and experiential 
knowledge didn’t play a role. Nevertheless, it is evident that the path- 
dependency of Chinese expatriates in European countries has made it 
difficult to learn and adapt to the local work environment that exhibits 
diverging and contrasting cultural values. This huge cross-cultural gap, 
often portrayed in the literature as “culture conflict”, constitutes the 
biggest challenge that Chinese companies face, in their international 
operations in general, and could undermine their effectiveness in doing 
business in European countries in particular. 
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    Makalah ini menyajikan proses investasi langsung keluar China di 
Eropa. Ia berpendapat bahwa motif penggerak perusahaan China untuk 
pergi ke luar negeri bertujuan memperoleh keterampilan baru, teknologi 
canggih, merek, dan rantai pasokan yang akan meningkatkan 
keunggulan kompetitif mereka di pasar internasional maupun domestik. 
Ciri yang luar biasa dari ekspansi bisnis lintas-batas Tiongkok adalah 
peran penting pemerintah dalam internasionalisasi MNC Cina yang 
didukung oleh instrumen kebijakan resmi, termasuk strategi "go global" 
yang terkenal dengan mendorong ribuan perusahaan China untuk 
berinvestasi di luar negeri. Untuk tujuan ini, investasi China di Eropa 
pada umumnya menargetkan ekonomi utama, yaitu Jerman, Inggris dan 
Perancis meskipun pertumbuhan investasi di negara-negara Eropa 
Selatan dan Tengah dalam beberapa tahun terakhir terutama setelah 
krisis keuangan. Merger dan akuisisi telah menjadi mode entri pasar 
terkemuka yang menghasilkan pengambilalihan besar-besaran yang 
menandai investasi China di Eropa. Serta jelas bahwa proses 
internasionalisasi perusahaan bisnis China tidak mengikuti model 
Uppsala tradisional karena jarak psikis dan pengetahuan pengalaman 
tidak berperan. Namun demikian, terbukti bahwa ketergantungan jalur 
dari ekspatriat China di negara-negara Eropa telah membuatnya sulit 
untuk belajar dan beradaptasi dengan lingkungan kerja lokal yang 
menunjukkan perbedaan nilai-nilai budaya. Kesenjangan lintas budaya 
yang besar ini, yang sering digambarkan dalam literatur sebagai "konflik 
budaya", merupakan tantangan terbesar yang dihadapi perusahaan 
China, dalam operasi internasional mereka secara umum, dan dapat 
merusak efektivitas mereka dalam melakukan bisnis di negara-negara 
Eropa pada khususnya. 
Kata Kunci: Budaya 
Internasionalisasi 
Bisnis, MNC China, Mode Masuk, 
INTRODUCTION 
     In this era of globalization, the internationalization of industrial 
goods and services has become a key feature of the global economy 
in which thousands of multinational companies (MNCs) along with 
their branch offices, also known as ‘subsidiaries’, are engaged in 
business worldwide(Gilpin, 2001). Business firms tend to 
internationalize via investing in the overseas often aiming at partial or 
complete control over marketing, production and assets in another 
economy (Gilpin, 2001). While this tendency of outward investment 
has been a phenomenon of the developed countries, 
internationalization from the developing nations is also getting a 
momentum economies with China recently emerging as one of the 
leading outward investors (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008; Parmentola, 
2010; Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2016). 
    Even though China’s contribution to the global outward direct 
investment was historically small, since the mid-2000s it has 
increased dramatically to reach USD 366 billion in 20 
     11 (EUCCC, 2013). The Chinese outward investment has grown 
substantially, especially in the years that followed the global financial 
crisis, to constitute roughly 10% of global FDI flows making China 
the world’s second largest investor after the USA (Dreger, Schüler- 
Zhou, & Schüller, 2017). Chinese investment activity is likely to 
intensify in areas like ICT, automated machinery, and medical 
devices over the next years due mainly to integration of markets 
(Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, & Schüller, 2017). It is in this vein that 
Clegg & Voss (2012, p. 8) described China as a “new colonial 
power” that is wielding its economic muscle and influencing the 
internal affairs of others. 
    Accordingly, the Chinese outward investment has become an 
issue of a particular importance in the global political economy over 
the last decade (Clegg & Voss, 2012; EUCCC, 2013). This is 
especially true in the context of Europe for it is a largest destination 
(twice as much of USA) of Chinese outward investment (Rabellotti, 
2017) absorbing slightly greater than 40% of Chinese investment 
stock in developed countries (Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, & Schüller, 
2017). The importance of Chinese investors in Europe is also 
demonstrated by a significant increase in the number of iconic 
acquisitions recently undertaken all over Europe (Rabellotti, 2017). 
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      Yet, as Nicolas & Thomsen (2008, p. 2) argued the implications for 
domestic firms in terms of competition could be far-reaching from “less 
well known is China’s diffuse but expanding footprint in Europe” (Tartar, 
Rojanasakul, & Diamond, 2018). This presence of the Chinese firms in 
Europe, described by others as the “March to the West,” has also the 
potential to bring substantial changes in the economic structure of the 
region as a whole (Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, & Schüller, 2017). It is against 
this background that this paper is designed in such a way to explore the 
driving factors and entry modes of Chinese business investment in Europe. 
METHODOLOGY 
    This research is designed to be an exploratory study. It is meant to be 
an exploratory research to provide an understanding of the fundamental 
rationale and patterns of evolution of Chinese outward direct investment, 
discuss internationalization strategies of Chinese MNCs in view of 
theoretical models and discuss how their culture affects their business 
engagements. To this end, this study has relied on secondary data collected 
from literature and utilized the qualitative approach of data analysis. In 
doing so, the author has reviewed the literature of international business, 
particularly relevant theories and models of internationalization, presented 
in the proceeding section. In the next section, the paper highlights the 
evolution of Chinese outward direct investment in a more general manner 
and discuss internationalization strategies of Chinese MNCs in view of 
theoretical models that explains the process. This is followed by an 
assessment of motives and drives, and entry modes of Chinese firms’ in 
outward direct investment in Europe. The fifth section of this paper shall 
give a cultural framework to the discussion of Chinese firms’ international 
business operations in the destination countries of Europe to vindicate the 
challenge that arises as a result of differences in doing business at home 
and host nations. The last section concludes by reiterating the major points 
and indicating the way forward. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Internationalization’: The Concept And Review Of Theories 
A glance at a literature reveals that “internationalization” is one of the most 
studied topics and its conceptualization has developed over the past half a 
century. Johnson and Vahlen (1977) defined “internationalization” as a 
process through which companies eventually increase their international 
business involvement. 
    It is a dynamic concept often understood as the process of increasing 
involvement in both inward and outward sides of international 
operations, which has the following dimensions, including: 
    (1) set of inter-related decisions and strategies; 
    (2) consists of the outflow and inflow of products, service or 
         resource that crosses national boarder; and 
    (3) internal factors of the firm and environmental forces influence 
         the process (Dawei, 2008). 
    The discussion on internationalization would inevitably bring crucial 
concepts, i.e. “internationalization strategy” and “entry mode” to the 
front. In this regard, Robert Gilpin (2001) states that foreign direct 
investment (FDI), mergers and ventures are among the usual 
international corporate strategy utilized as entry modes to establish a 
permanent position in another economy. FDI generally entails either the 
building of new facilities to create a subsidiary from scratch, known as 
“greenfield” investment (Hellström, 2016), or the purchase of existing 
businesses often accompanied by takeovers and intercorporate alliances 
with firms of other countries, called “merger and acquisitions” (M&A) 
(Gilpin, 2001; Aureli & Demartini, 2010; Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 
2011). 
Although multinational firms have existed for a very long time, studies 
on internationalization are relatively recent. Early empirical researches, 
in 1960s, on the subject, made a distinction between ‘exporting’ versus 
‘FDI’ (Buckley & Casson, 1998). Pioneer, in this regard, is Vernon’s 
product cycle theory, which upholds that firms go through an exporting 
phase before switching first to market seeking FDI, and then to cost- 
orientated FDI, in which technological and marketing forces explain 
standardization and location decisions (Buckley & Casson, 1998). In the 
1970s, scholars identified licensing, franchising and subcontracting as 
other strategic options, and “co-operative arrangements” like M&A and 
international joint ventures (IJVs) became important in 1980s (Buckley 
& Casson, 1998; Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). In the last decade 
of 20th century, the cost and cultural factors have come back to the scene 
with the regard to the discussion on doing business abroad especially due 
to the tremendous increase of the role of FDI in developing countries 
such as China and Vietnam (Buckley & Casson, 1998). 
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      In general, the past half a century has witnessed the emergence of 
variety of theories dedicated to the explanation of conducting business 
abroad and firms’ internationalization strategies. These theories and 
models range from “Internalization” and “Principal-Agent” theories, 
which are based on neoclassical economic assumptions of cost 
minimization and risk avoidance; to the ‘behavioral’ approach that views 
international expansion as series of decisions made by managers with 
“bounded rationality”; to “imperialism” that regards international 
investments an attempt to monopolize business activities abroad in which 
critical importance of state intervention is considered; to “born global 
approach” that poses composite “global frame-of-reference” in which the 
so called “soft factors” like international networks as prerequisites 
(Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011; Buckley & Casson, 1998; Kessler, 
Prandini, & Wu, 2014). However, for the purpose of this paper, I would 
only emphasize on three conventional models and present them as per 
their relevance for understanding and analysis of the Chinese firms’ 
internationalization to European nation, which will be discussed 
thoroughly in the proceeding sections. 
The Uppsala Model of Internationalization 
     The Uppsala model, often called the “Scandinavian stages model” of 
entry, views the internationalization process as a sequential pattern of 
entry into successive foreign markets. This process includes firm’s 
engagement in (i) purely domestic activities, then (ii) start exporting via 
independent representatives, (iii) establishing sales subsidiary, and (iv) 
production or manufacturing in foreign economy (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). 
     This model is based on the distinction between state and change 
aspects of internationalization variables. The state aspects are market 
commitment and knowledge of foreign markets, whereas the change 
aspects are decisions to commit resources and performance of current 
activities, and hence, “interplay between cumulative market knowledge 
and decisions to increase commitment to international markets” 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). The 
basic idea being, the market knowledge and market commitment 
influence both commitment decisions and the current business decisions, 
which, in turn, affect market knowledge and commitment and vice versa 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). 
         The stages model also underlines the importance of two 
crucial motions: “psychic distance”, the socio-cultural and linguistic 
differences, levels of economic development and patterns of business 
practices, etc.; and “experiential knowledge,” their general 
experience in trans-border activities (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
According to this model, firms are supposed after strengthening their 
domestic business position, firms could minimize the perceived 
uncertainty and enhance opportunities if they start foreign business 
with minimum psychic distance and through experiential knowledge 
(Ibid.). 
Resource Based View (RBV) 
      The resource-based view (RBV) upholds that firms’ 
internationalization and the entry mode comes with the desire to 
utilize different resources that a company has in particular local 
context, and to drive optimum the opportunity for organizational 
learning (Barney, 1991). The RBV views business firms as a 
combination of physical, financial and other intangible resources. The 
intangible resources include, inter alia, human capital, technological 
assets, brands, organizational image (Parmentola, 2010; Barney, 
1991). There is a consensus among scholars that resources are 
necessary prerequisite for sustainable competitive advantage though 
dependent on value, rareness, imitability and substitutability (Barney, 
1991; Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). 
      Aharoni et al (2011) argue that, from perspective of RBV, 
management practices and skills such as problem-solving ability, 
discipline and motivation are nothing but resources of MNCs 
embodied within human capital that could be used as a leverage for 
competitive advantage in the international marketplace. Building on 
this premise, scholars argue that the foreign market entry mode 
decisions are generally driven by the desire to exploit existing 
resources in wider markets and to increase them with new resources 
via obtaining as well as developing strategic resources available 
elsewhere (Parmentola, 2010). 
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Network Perspective 
      The network perspective attempts to address the importance of “soft 
factors,” one being the relevance of ‘networks’ in the internationalization 
process (Kessler, Prandini, & Wu, 2014). It is Johanson & Vahlne who 
continued examining the Uppsala model of the process of 
internationalization and have come up, in 1990, with this model by 
applying a network perspective via including knowledge gained through 
relationships with other bodies on the foreign market operations. It is 
argued here that industrial networks, formed as a result of interactions 
with other firms, affect foreign investment activities, which in turn shapes 
a firm’s market knowledge (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). 
      To this end, ‘internationalization’ is understood as developing 
networks of business relationships in other countries through extension, 
penetration, and integration (Dawei, 2008). It has to be noted, here, that 
‘extension’ means the creation of new set of networks, whereas 
‘penetration’ entailed enhancing the already prevailing positions of the 
firm through increasing resource commitments in networks, and 
‘integration’ meant the coordination of different national networks 
(Dawei, 2008). Thus, if the relationships between firms are seen as a 
network, it can be argued that firms internationalize because other firms 
in their international network are doing so (Ibid.). 
      The strength of the network model of internationalization is in 
explaining the process rather than the existence of multinational or 
international firms. From the network perspective, the internationalization 
strategy of a firm is explained by the need to: 
        (i) reduce the requirement for knowledge development, 
        (ii) cut the demand for modification, and 
        (iii) make use of the available network positions (Dawei, 2008). 
         Besides, the network model presents the importance of the 
firm’s own business network and the relevant network in the foreign 
market both of which are necessary conditions for successful 
internationalization (Kessler, Prandini, & Wu, 2014). Since firms 
operate in a well-developed and competitive networks, 
internationalization through external resources appears to be the best 
strategic option, especially to small firms, in the face of globalization. 
As a result, mergers and acquisitions, co-operation, alliance and joint 
ventures may become a major source of international network instability 
for which firms in the network have to be prepared (Kessler, Prandini, 
& Wu, 2014). In the next section, the above theories will be utilized to 
explain the internationalization process in the context of Chinese 
companies. 
 RESULT 
 Chinese Outward Direct Investment 
 Evolution of Chinese OFDI 
A wide array of literature portray that China has, historically, been 
rather the major recipient of foreign direct investment, and thus only 
a minor contributor to global investment flows(Aureli & 
Demartini, 2010). However, the 1978 reform became a turning point 
as China eventually rose as a global outward investor and net capital 
exporter (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012; Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
Following the reform, “Going Out” strategies were adopted in such 
a way to widen opportunity for export markets and to enhance the 
capacity and experience of Chinese multinational corporations 
(Guerrero, 2017). However, the outward investment during the first 
decade was generally limited due to over regulation of the national 
government until the late 1990s, when the government launched the 
so called “go global” (zou chu qu) policy (Nicolas & Thomsen, 
2008). Below is the diagrammatic depiction of the phases of Chinese 
outward foreign direct investment. 
 JURNAL STUDI 
PEMERINTAHAN 
597 
Source: Nicolas and Thomsen (2008, p. 3). 
  Figure 1: China’s OFDI & Cross-border Acquisitions (in Mill. 
                         USD), 1982-2006 
    As shown, in the diagram above, the five phases of Chinese 
 OFDI are: 
a. Phase I (1979–83): This phase was characterized by limited 
   investment activities abroad because they are strictly linked to 
   the political objectives of the government. Only state-owned 
   companies and provincial and municipal-based corporations were 
   allowed to invest overseas upon approval of the State Council 
   (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
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c. 
d. 
e. 
Hence, many companies did not have the desire or capacity to go 
for internationalization in the years that followed the reform 
(Hanemann & Rosen, 2012). 
Phase II: This time “gradual opening,” witnessed the 
standardisation of approval procedures during the period from 
1984 up to 1992. Non-state firms were allowed to go abroad 
although the autonomy of the overseas investment of these 
enterprises was restricted through complex procedures and fund 
limitations (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
Phase III (1993–98): During this time, the Chinese government 
strengthened regulations on overseas investment projects with a 
view to ensuring that capital was properly invested in the 
overseas for productive purposes (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
Phase IV (1999–2002): This is when the “go global” strategy 
started as the firms got official support from the Chinese 
government to do business in overseas in view of encouraging 
the Chinese export. This time, the government granted export tax 
incentives, lifting tight controls on foreign exchange and 
reducing administrative requirement (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008; 
Ebbers & Zhang, 2010). 
Phase V: this period covered the time after the adoption of “go 
global” strategy. The ‘go global’ policy was confirmed at the 
CCP’s 16th Congress in 2002 with the aim of encouraging local 
firms to take part in the international markets with the investment 
decisions of their own. Unlike what it used to do earlier, the 
government gradually became a mere supporter and service 
provider with some authorities grated to local level governments 
and foreign currency controls are relaxed (Nicolas & Thomsen, 
2008). 
    Following the go global policy, the Chinese outward FDI flows 
exploded in the mid-2000s (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012). As of 2007, the 
magnitude of the Chinese outward investment has become 128 billion 
USD (three-fourth of which is outside the financial sector), as more than 
ten thousand Chinese MNCs have taken part in FDI in more than 170 
countries making China one of the top outward investors (Nicolas & 
Thomsen, 2008). Since 2012, and after a series of policy adjustments and 
buoyed by huge state subsidies, several government owned enterprises 
(SOEs), private telecom companies, electronics producers & suppliers, 
and real estate companies have all actively ‘gone out’ (Guerrero, 2017). 
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    To this end, Chinese firms have headed to every corner of the 
globe with aim of securing resources and technology that its modern 
booming economy requires but also to get global recognition for 
Chinese brands (Ibid.). 
Internationalization Strategies of Chinese MNCs in Theoretical 
Lens 
      Several scholarly works have tried to explain the 
internationalization strategy of Chinese companies by making use of 
the mainstream literature on multinationals’ development. A study 
conducted on 18 Chinese business firms has made it possible to locate 
investments along the value chain stages: headquarters, innovative 
activities, sales activities, logistics and distribution activities, and 
production activities (Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 2017). Such 
classification of Chinese firms’ internationalization into value chain 
stages typically resemble the traditional “Scandinavian/ Uppsala 
model” which views internationalization as series of business 
engagement from the domestic activity to export, then to sales and 
manufacturing in foreign economy. On the contrary, other studies 
show that the internationalization process of the Chinese companies, 
compared to that of Western World, is determined by range of factors 
and thus, have its own unique features that cannot be explained using 
the conventional theories of firm’s internationalization (Parmentola, 
2010). After thoroughly studying the two Chinese giants (Haier and 
HiSense), Parmentola (2010) has found out that the 
internationalisation choice of these firms: 
 i. are meant to minimize competitive disadvantage in local markets 
      through acquisition of “strategic immaterial resources” rather 
      than aiming to exploit existing resources; 
 ii. have started to invest, as part of their international business, in 
      developed countries (US and Europe) that have greater “psychic 
      distance” due to both geographic and cultural distant from China; 
 iii. adopted different and slightly complex entry modes even during 
      early phase of their internationalization processes; 
 iv. did not gain market knowledge through a “learning-by-doing 
      behaviour,” in most cases Chinese firms adopt an “imitative- 
      learning behaviour,” observing other Chinese firms and foreign 
      competitors, in order to acquire necessary knowledge in the 
      initial phase of their internationalisation process (Parmentola, 
      2010). 
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      Taking this factors into account, Parmentola (2010), has 
come up with an alternative theoretical model based on new 
hypotheses that in part contrast but also combines the two 
traditional models of International Business, i.e. the RBV and 
the Uppsala model, in order to describe and analyse the process 
of internationalization of the Chinese companies. 
Source: Parmentola (2010, p. 272) 
Figure 2: Parmentola’s Alternative Model of Chinese 
           Companies Internationalization 
      According to Parmentola (2010), the internationalization 
process of Chinese firms starts from a low level of market 
knowledge and limited experience (as indicated in Point-1 in the 
Figure 2 below), entering into distant market (often a developed 
country), in the very first phase, using complex entry mode (as 
acquisitions and/or JV) that would help them obtain market 
knowledge and the brand reputation (as depicted in node-2 above) 
necessary to export in the same distant markets (node-3) and to 
acquire a competitive advantage in the home market (node-4). He 
further argues that it is only in the second phase that the Chinese 
firms are able to undergo the internationalization pattern (along the 
node 4 to 5) that resembles expansion of developed countries firms 
after accumulating and exploiting the acquired resources and 
experience to enter gradually into near markets (Parmentola, 2010). 
      Other scholars have opted to adopt the network model to 
explain the internationalization of Chinese MNCs. It is the personal 
relationships and unofficial networks that significantly helped 
Chinese companies in achieving their goals (Kessler, Prandini, & 
Wu, 2014; Drahokoupil, 2017; Miedtank, 2017). 
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         Chinese companies, being late comers in the global FDI, 
lacking market-specific business knowledge, need the acquisition of 
relevant network necessary for the growth and expansion of business 
activities abroad (Kessler, Prandini, & Wu, 2014). From this 
perspective, Chinese MNCs have to internationalize to establish 
relevant network in the foreign market that would enable them 
overcome disadvantages at home and/or to meet international 
standards. Lenovo’s major motive to internationalize, for example, 
was to enhance its international networks in such a way to advance its 
technology and gain international recognition (Miedtank, 2017). Once 
IBM agreed to distribute Lenovo’s PCs, Lenovo’s acquisition sped up, 
the company increased its internationalization with recognition due to 
the international network. In the same fashion, other Chinese 
companies investing in European firms, such as Huawei and Geely, 
have been doing the same to establish a strong network to adapt to 
international standards or to strengthen their position in the Chinese 
market itself (Miedtank, 2017). QJ corporation, a Chinese SOE 
investing Italian automotive sector, represents another example in this 
regard (Aureli & Demartini, 2010). 
         Nicolas and Thomsen (2008) strengthened the same 
viewpoint arguing that the collectivist culture of Asian societies 
necessitates relationships for the simple reason that it enhances 
competitiveness via minimizing costs of transactions. This has 
helped Chinese firms to acquire much better “social capital” that 
effectively lowered their transaction cost and gave them an 
advantage, over the Western companies, in forming and managing 
alliances and networks that characterizes their internationalization 
process (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). Unlike the traditional MNCs, 
which are highly tied to a ‘home base’, the Chinese companies are 
more likely to start to be global in their attitude, strategy and 
organization. It is further argued that the “Dragon multinationals” 
are “not burdened with historical baggage in their organizational 
structures, strategies and mentalities that derive from a previous 
era”, which has offered the “rapidly acquired advantages over 
slower-moving, even in markets that have traditionally been viewed 
as global” (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008, p. 28). 
         Similarly, Luo and Tung (2007) argued, in what they termed 
as a “springboard model”, that the Chinese companies have 
systematically used international expansion as a “springboard” for 
acquiring valuable resources and assets, ultimately boosting their 
position in international market. 
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         These “springboards” are reported to have enabled the Chinese 
companies are able to overcome their competitive disadvantages and 
domestic institutional challenges, which eventually made them strong 
competitors in the international markets (Luo & Tung, 2007). Access to 
advanced technologies and specific industrial knowledge, among other 
things, has assisted Chinese companies to compensate for their competitive 
disadvantages (Kessler, Prandini, & Wu, 2014). 
         Others have come up with the so-called “leap-frogging strategy”, 
“sideward crawl strategy”, to describe and explain the Chinese companies’ 
internationalization “targeting market in developing countries first is 
similar to crab, which walks sideward and go very far away without 
noticing anyone so that they would apply their “low-cost, non-brand 
products” in these countries as they do in domestic markets (UK Essays, 
2015). All these explain why many Chinese companies investing in Europe 
systematically organize and maintain longer-term strategic operations with 
merger and acquisitions as a preferred market entry mode (Kessler, 
Prandini, & Wu, 2014). This will directly take us to the motives, market 
entry modes, ownership patterns and major destinations of Chinese 
outward investment in Europe, which are discussed in the next section. 
Chinese Outward Direct Investment to Europe 
As part of the transition by Chinese investors from an interest in 
developing economies to high-income economies, Europe has become an 
important destination for Chinese outward FDI (Hellström, 2016). This 
was manifested in the “take-off”, a decade ago, when annual inflows 
tripled from 2006 to 2009, tripled again by 2011 to $10 billion (€7.4 
billion), and the deals with value of more than 1 million USD doubled 
from less than 50 to almost 100 in 2010 and 2011 (Hanemann & Rosen, 
2012). In fact, in 2014-15, the EU was estimated to be the largest market 
for Chinese acquisitions, in terms of value(Hellström, 2016). 
Accordingly, there is a consensus that Europe has begun experiencing a 
structural transformation in outward direct investment by Chinese firms. 
Motives and Drives of Chinese OFDI in Europe 
         The motives and drives of Chinese companies outward direct 
invest in Europe have been well studied and yet of divided opinion. 
Drahokoupil (2017) posits that the main driver of Chinese business 
internationalization was ‘political’ as the government has long been 
influencing Chinese companies’ investment strategies taking into account 
several factors such as level of development, economic perspectives, and 
the interests of individual target countries. 
         The state has affected the “overseas investment strategies of 
Chinese firms in many ways such as through the allocation of credit, 
the degree of competition in the home market, or its role as owner of 
corporate assets” (Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, & Schüller, 2017). As 
perfectly captured by Kessler et al (2014), although the market 
system has developed over the last decades, China continues to be a 
“political economy” due to active governmental involvement in 
business via ownership and regulation. 
         The Chinese outward direct investment trends and evolutions 
described above cannot be understood without reference to the role of 
the state and its policies which have evolved from restrictions to 
encouragement (Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, & Schüller, 2017). And, this 
was clearly manifested in the ‘Going-out’ or ‘Going Global’ strategy 
which became part of the official economic policy when it was 
included in the 10th Five-year Plan for 2001–2005 (Drahokoupil, 
2017). Even more is to come as “the Chinese government—within the 
framework of the Made in China 2025 strategy–is striving for 
worldwide leadership in key technologies by 2049”, the 100-year 
anniversary of the People’s Republic (Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, & 
Schüller, 2017, p. 157). Looking at this new phenomenon, i.e. China 
deploying capital beyond its borders, some scholars have even 
portrayed the country’s geopolitical intent as a reason for its overseas 
investment and as an indicator of Chinese wider international political 
strategy (Clegg & Voss, 2012). 
         According to Hanemann & Rosen (2012), however, Chinese 
direct investment in Europe is driven overwhelmingly by commercial 
motives. They argue that although “China’s policies of 
encouragement of going abroad are impacting investment decisions, 
firms can make rational judgments about locating operations” via 
appraising opportunities in the European markets (Hanemann & 
Rosen, 2012). They also contend that the “mix of industries targeted, 
the high number of private enterprises making investments, and the 
competitive behaviour of companies after they arrive and set up shop 
in Europe all point to profit” as the greatest motive in China’s 
outward FDI story. Generally, as Nicolas & Thomsen (2008) noted, 
many Chinese firms investment in Europe has been driven by their 
interest to maintain their competitiveness globally instead of 
harnessing locally available advantages. Nevertheless, Chinese firms 
are involved in internationalization, investing abroad driven by profit, 
like any other commercially motivated investors, of course, taking 
into account a wide range of considerations. 
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      An empirical study conducted by Blomkvist & Drogendijk 
(2016) has revealed that, between 2003 and 2012, the main motives 
for Chinese investment in Europe are “market seeking” and “strategic 
asset seeking”. In the same vein, other studies have revealed that the 
desire to obtain advanced technology, brands, management skills, 
distribution channels in such a way to guarantee themselves direct 
access to the European markets and acquire cheap assets on sale, 
especially after the financial crisis of 2008 (Hellström, 2016; 
Rabellotti, 2017). Explicitly stated, the Chinese firms utilize 
“international expansion in order to tap into resources that would 
otherwise be unavailable” (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008, p. 27). 
      For many Chinese firms, the acquisition of well-known brands 
and technological know-how are the fundamental elements for 
breaking away from a competition back home (Hanemann & Rosen, 
2012). And, in Western European countries, access to advanced 
technologies and established brands has helped Chinese businesses 
get higher position in the global value chain and become more 
competitive. According to Dreger et al (2017), the world’s three 
largest manufacturers, all based in Germany or Italy, are now under 
Chinese control. China has also acquired some of Europe’s leading 
providers of ICT, energy, robotics and automotive products (Dreger, 
Schüler-Zhou, & Schüller, 2017). 
      The investment drive is motivated, moreover, by a need to 
export capital rather than creating domestic bubbles. Oversupply in 
the Chinese industrial sector, combined with a stock market slump 
since June 2015, has led to disenchantment with investment 
opportunities in the Chinese market. In addition, domestic financing 
of overseas corporate takeovers has become much less costly as a 
result of low interest rates and continued liberalization of Chinese 
capital control. Such cyclical factors contribute to the recent 
acceleration in China’s cross-border acquisitions. At the same time, 
China seeks expertise and experience in higher-end industries and 
services, which has led to a shift in Chinese investment from 
developing and emerging economies to high-income economies 
(Hellström, 2016). 
Geographic Distribution of Chinese OFDI in Europe 
Studies conducted by different scholars on geographical distribution 
of Chinese OFDI reveal that there are large differences among 
European countries in absorbing Chinese investments (Blomkvist & 
Drogendijk, 2016). Nevertheless, Europe’s big three, i.e. Germany, 
United Kingdom and France, are the leading destinations 
(Hanemann & Rosen, 2012). 
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         In the year 2012 alone, these three economies, have received 
nearly 9 billion USD OFDI from China, which amounts to 50 per cent of 
all Chinese FDI stock in the EU countries (Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 
2017). These countries together with the Netherlands, Italy and Spain 
have absorbed about 76 per cent of the total of Chinese investments in 
the EU between 2003 & 2014 (Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 2017). 
During the same period, of all the countries, Germany is, by far, found to 
be the top destination of Chinese investments, receiving 37 per cent of 
total investments between 2003-2014 (Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 
2017). The Chinese investment in Germany are mainly in the automotive 
industry, by and large, going to Bavaria as a special cluster, and in the 
machine industry, in which the main attracting regions are again Bavaria 
and Baden Wurttemberg (Ibid.). Yet, there is an important “core- 
periphery divide”, when it comes to Chinese outward investment in 
Europe manifested in the Greece, Portugal and Cyprus skepticism about 
Germany, France and Italy pushing for an EU-wide investment screening 
mechanism that the former governments think would undermine their 
ability to attract necessary capital (Tartar, Rojanasakul, & Diamond, 
2018). 
Ownership Pattern of Chinese ODI in Europe 
Looking at the ownership patterns, Chinese outward foreign investment 
capital is increasingly coming from private sector, while state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have continued to dominate the investment made in 
Europe (Hellström, 2016). In all, more than 670 Chinese entities have 
invested in Europe since 2008. Of those, almost 100 are state-backed 
companies or investment funds, which collectively had a hand in 
transactions worth at least $162 billion, or 63 percent of the total 
reported deal value, as compiled by Bloomberg (Tartar, Rojanasakul, & 
Diamond, 2018). Eight of the 10 largest acquirers identified were either 
state-owned or backed by government including the Silk Road Fund Co., 
a sovereign wealth fund connected to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, 
see Table 1 below (Tartar, Rojanasakul, & Diamond, 2018). 
         Table 1: Top Ten Chinese Companies Investing in Europe 
                                (2008-2018) 
S.N. 
  1. 
  2. 
  3. 
  4. 
  5. 
  6. 
  7. 
  8. 
  9. 
  10. 
Name of the Chinese Company 
China National Chemical Corp. 
China Investment Corp. 
Aluminum Corp. of China Ltd. 
Avic Capital Co. 
Silk Road Fund Co. 
Tencent Holdings Ltd. 
China Petrochemical Corp. 
China Cinda Asset Management Co. 
Shanghai Pudong Dev. Bank Co. 
China Citic Bank Corp. 
Source: Tartar, Rojanasakul & Diamond (2018) 
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Inv. Value (Bill. USD) 
         58.2 
         24.2 
         14.1 
         11.6 
         10.5 
          9.9 
          8.8 
          8.6 
          8.6 
          8.6 
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      An additional 30 or more entities are currently owned by one of 
China’s provinces or municipalities (Tartar, Rojanasakul, & Diamond, 
2018). State Owned Enterprise (SOEs) have made an investment worth 
78% of the total investment value Between 2008 and 2013 (Dekeyser, 
2017). After 2015, it is the privately owned enterprises (POEs) that have 
risen to lead Chinese investment in Europe in terms of the number of 
deals from 30% in 2015 to 74% in 2016, accompanied by the growth of 
its share in total investment value risen from just less than 5% before 
2010 to more than 30% in 2013 and more recently even trying to overtake 
(Dekeyser, 2017). 
      Yet, the line between state and private enterprises is far more 
blurred in China: The Cosco group of companies, a container shipping 
consisting of publicly traded branches of state-owned China Ocean 
Shipping Group Co., and has bought stakes in, or operate in, ports from 
the Bosphorus to the Baltic Sea (Tartar, Rojanasakul, & Diamond, 2018). 
Nonetheless, the SOEs dominated nature of Chinese OFDI has brought a 
concern among many of the EU governments with regard to the 
“potentially non-commercial or political motives” of Chinese firms to 
invest in Europe (Dekeyser, 2017), besides the criticisms continuing as 
to the close relationships between investors and political interests 
(Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, & Schüller, 2017). 
Entry Modes Types of Chinese ODI in Europe 
         Studies show that early phase of Chines OFDI of big value began 
in the form of international joint ventures (IJV), Chang’An Motors and 
Nanjing Automobile Group being good examples for managing to start 
producing motor vehicles with European, USA, Japanese and other 
companies of developed world (Aureli & Demartini, 2010). Eventually, 
the Chinese OFDI in Europe has been dominated by greenfield projects in 
wide range of sectors which is often described as “unusual” entry mode 
for a developing country (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012). After the 
implementation of the “go global” policy, it appears that the vast majority 
of China’s FDI in Europe comes in the form of merger and acquisitions 
(Aureli & Demartini, 2010). In 2004, the Chinese company Nanjing 
Automobile Group (NAG) bought British MG Rover production line and 
brand (Aureli & Demartini, 2010). According to Hellström (2016), 
acquisitions consisted greater than 95% of China’s outward investment 
flows to the EU in the year 2015 alone. 
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                           (2016, p. 22). 
Figure 3: Chinese OFDI in EU by Entry Mode (Investment in 
                  Million USD) 2000-2015 
    Major acquisitions of European firms, including Volvo (Swedish car 
maker), and Kuka (the Germany’s industrial robot maker), have 
attracted a significant interest besides the Chinese investment in Piraeus 
(Greek’s shipping terminal) and Hinkley Point C (the proposed British 
nuclear power facility) (Hellström, 2016; Aureli & Demartini, 2010). In 
2016 alone, 37 Chinese stakes in German companies, estimated to be 
9.7 Billion Euros, were completed or announced, including the 
purchase of mechanical engineering company KraussMaffei for 925 
million Euros (Bian & Emons, 2017). And, as the pace of acquisitions 
is dramatically rising, it has become a reality that, on average, one 
German company falls into Chinese ownership each week (Bian & 
Emons, 2017). 
    Currently, Chinese investors own, partially or wholly, “at least four 
airports, six seaports, wind farms in at least nine countries and 13 
professional soccer teams” (Tartar, Rojanasakul, & Diamond, 2018). 
Investors in the service and electronics sectors, on the other hand, such 
as ICBC, Huawei & ZTE only invest using the greenfield entry mode 
(Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 2017). It is worth mentioning here that 
many Chinese firms also employ combination of greenfield as well as 
M&A (mergers and acquisitions) at a time, a phenomenon described by 
Amendolagine & Rabellotti (2017) as “complex entry mode strategy”. 
Such complex entry modes have often been used in the capital and 
knowledge intensive manufacturing industry, such as automotive 
(SAIC), chemicals (ChemChina, China National Chemical), and energy 
(Suntech Power Holdings) (Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 2017). 
Source: Hellström 
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However, as alluded to, the vast majority of the Chinese firms investment 
in Europe has taken the form of M&A, and this is the reason why many 
question whether the Chinese investment in Europe is either one of 
corporate takeovers (Hellström, 2016). 
Top Sectors of Engagement 
     Chinese investments in the European countries cover a wide range of 
economic sectors that differ substantially across years. It is reported, 
however, four out of five acquisitions, on average, are in manufacturing 
(Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 2017). In the service industry, 18 per cent of 
the acquisitions are in the computer and programming industry and the 
remaining ones are in publishing, information services and 
telecommunications (Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 2017). 
       Table 2: Top Chinese Investment in Europe by Sectors (2008- 
                                    2018) 
S.N. 
  1. 
  2. 
  3. 
  4. 
  5. 
  6. 
  7. 
  8. 
  9. 
  10. 
Investment Sector 
Chemicals 
Energy 
Mining 
Internet/Software 
Automotive 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Entertainment 
Commercial 
Construction 
Value (in Bill USD) 
        48.8 
        34.5 
        23.1 
        15.1 
        14.8 
        14.3 
         8.6 
         7.8 
         6.9 
         6.6 
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Source: Adapted from Tartar, Rojanasakul & Diamond (2018) 
    According to Amendolagine & Rabellotti (2017), whose study covered 
836 deals of Chinese firms investing in Europe (2003-2011), nearly a half 
of the Chinese investments are directed to only four industries: electronics 
(15.31%), machinery and engines (13.64%), communications (11.6%) and 
automotive (7.42%). Between 2010 and 2014 for instance, 95% of Chinese 
investment in the EU was concentrated in seven business sectors, with one- 
third in the energy sector, 23% in real estate, followed by manufacturing, 
agriculture, finance and ICT (Amendolagine & Rabellotti, 2017). 
    Recently, however, other sectors such as hospitality industry, utilities, 
transportation, and infrastructure have also become important, due to a 
sharp decline in FDI in real estate combined with decrease of capital for 
the energy sector (Dekeyser, 2017). Although Chinese investment in 
Europe has witnessed a growing diversification of sectors, making it 
difficult to predict top target industries, recent figures show an increasing 
appetite for advanced manufacturing assets, which counted for more than 
one third of total Chinese investment in the EU in 2015 and 2016, mainly 
motivated to upgrade their technological knowhow (Dekeyser, 2017). 
Chinese and European Cultural Differences in Doing Business 
      In this section, an attempt is made to present a summary of 
scholarly findings and discussions regarding some common patterns 
of doing business among Chinese companies vis-à-vis the local 
culture in Europe as per their relevance. 
      The concept of “culture” is so broad and dynamic that, 
nonetheless, encompasses norms, values, expectations, artefacts and 
belief systems shared by the members of a society (Hofstede, 2001). 
Culture defines the ways of living through influencing people’s 
attitudes and behaviours in the everyday social interactions (Aureli & 
Demartini, 2010). And, “business culture” is generally defined as the 
culture in which people do business and how they interact with each 
other while doing business (Kessler, Prandini, & Wu, 2014). It 
includes, inter alia, norms, individual values and organizational 
values, working language, symbols, beliefs and working habits 
(Hofstede, 2001). 
      It is argued that national culture does shape business culture as it 
influences the cognition and information domain of decision-makers 
thereby affecting the way decisions are taken, strategies formulated 
and goals identified and oriented (Aureli & Demartini, 2010). 
Besides, cultural values are basically difficult to modify unless 
external economic, technical or social conditions undergo a major 
change (Aureli & Demartini, 2010). To this end, it is normal to 
observe significant cultural differences, between European countries 
and China, which are self-revealing in the way businesses are 
conducted. Instead, understanding the core values of the Chinese 
investors in managing their business in subsidiaries and the manner of 
their interaction with the local workforce is pervasive in so far as the 
most Chinese companies are “doing business in a Chinese way” in 
Europe (Miedtank, 2017; Drahokoupil, 2017; Kessler, Prandini, & 
Wu, 2014). These are indications of the fact that Chinese managers 
doing business in Europe may encounter several difficulties in 
working with local managers and employees as the introduction of 
their own business practices in strategy formulation, management 
control and HRM, which could potentially contrast with existing 
workforce attitudes, behaviors and management systems (Aureli & 
Demartini, 2010). Table 3, below, presents the cultural differences of 
China and four major destination countries of Chinese OFDI in 
Europe, as reflected in the scores for five cultural dimensions of 
Hofsted’s index (2001). 
  JURNAL STUDI 
PEMERINTAHAN 
609 
Vol. 9 No. 4 
November 
2018 
Table 3: Cultural Dimensions of China and Four Destination 
                    Countries of Europe 
S.N. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Cultural Dimensions (CD) 
Individualism 
Power Distance 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Masculinity 
Long–term Orientation 
China 
 15 
 80 
 40 
 50 
 114 
Scores of Individual Country 
  France Germany Italy 
    716776 
    683550 
    866575 
    436670 
    n/s31n/s 
UK 
89 
35 
35 
66 
25 610 
Source: Hofstede’s Cultural Map (2001). 
         Although there are no values for Italy and France with regard to 
the time orientation in Hofstede’s (2001) work, it appears, from the score 
of Germany and Great Britain, whose average is 28, that China is also 
characterized by a considerable long-term orientation. And, if one 
compares the mean value of the five cultural dimensions of the four 
countries in the above table with that of China, it appears that Chines are 
significantly different from these European countries. in terms of 
individualism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance, despite some 
degree of similarity on masculinity, see Figure 4. 
China Ave. of 4 Major Desti. of Chinese OFDI in Eur. 
Long–term 
Orientation 
Individualism 
 120 
 100 
  80 
  60 
  40 
  20 
   0 
Power Distance 
Masculinity 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Source: Own Computation and Adaptation from Hofsted’s Index (2001). 
Figure 4: CD Scores of China vis-à-vis Mean of Four European 
                           Nations 
       It is self-revealing, in Figure 4 (see above), that the Chinese 
scores for long-term orientation, individualism and power distance is 
almost a direct contrast compared to the average value of four 
countries in which they mostly do their business. This implies that 
Chinese are strongly oriented towards achievement of long-term 
goals, while its European counterparts aim at avoiding uncertainty of 
any form. The low score for individualism indicates how Chinese are 
collectivist that values teamwork as opposed to the four destination 
countries. Similarly, the Chinese meaning of power and authority, 
formal positions and status happens to be more or less the opposite to 
the European nation due to the nature of Chinese social structure 
which is strongly hierarchical. These differences observed in the 
scores for the cultural dimensions have been verified by several 
empirical studies conducted on Chinese subsidiaries found in various 
European countries. 
       Kessler et al (2014) confirmed, after studying 50 Chinese 
firms, that the Chinese culture is ‘collectivistic’ and ‘network- 
oriented’, as opposed to the European value of ‘individualism’, which 
is inherently reflected in the Chinese management practices. Chinese 
managers in subsidiaries, for instance, prefer to seek help within their 
network instead of trying to obtain professional assistance in order to 
overcome the challenges they face, or they prefer to “learn by trial 
and error” (Kessler, Prandini, & Wu, 2014, p. 29). This collectivistic 
culture of the Chinese is also evident in “company performance” 
which is considered as the achievement of team efforts of all persons 
involved in operations. Hence, Chinese managers and employees tend 
to have a strong sense of loyalty and duty toward the organization, 
which is perceived as a strong cohesive group where relations are 
based upon trust (Aureli & Demartini, 2010). 
       In China, work relations are understood are strongly 
hierarchical in contrast to European countries, where it is more equal 
despite differences across countries. In Chinese companies, orders are 
supposed to be strictly obeyed and the instructions of higher ranked 
employees are followed due to high power distance that defines the 
hierarchical work relations. This is often manifested in the 
“managerial unilateralism” and “authoritarian style of leadership” that 
the Chinese expatriate managers have been pursuing in Europe, where 
local employees perceive them as “less social” (in UK), as 
“problematic and dysfunctional” (in Germany) and more “work 
centered” (in Italy) as they expect overtime work from workers even 
during religious holidays (Miedtank, 2017, p. 84). 
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      There is also marked cultural difference between European 
countries and China in terms of is ‘directness’ that could be explained by 
power distance. Chinese expatriates usually avoid direct conflicts at all 
levels via escaping debates with managers and workers on their decisions 
regarding work performance assessment (both in terms of methods and 
accompanying reward systems) benefits and incentives (Miedtank, 2017; 
Aureli & Demartini, 2010). The Chinese tend to be indirect in criticism, 
which contrasts with the more direct feedback style of Europeans. 
Chinese managers often focused on the solution, instead of the person, if 
a mistake is committed, which is perceived to be ineffective by local 
European employees (Miedtank, 2017; Aureli & Demartini, 2010). From 
the perspective of the Chinese managers, high power distance means that 
they should not involve in any direct confrontation that leads to ‘conflict’ 
because it amounts to “losing reputation” within the organization; 
whereas, the lower power distance of local employees in Europe presents 
“scarce conformity and deference to authority” resulting in 
misunderstandings between the two groups (Aureli & Demartini, 2010, 
pp. 21-22). 
      Aureli & Demartini (2010) have studied a state-owned Chinese 
corporation, QJ, that acquired the Italian motorcycle, and found out that 
Chinese managerial systems do not only diverge but also contrast the 
Italian culture of business as observed in: (i) planning orientation, (ii) 
systems of control and (iii) HRM deriving from the merging of two 
different cultures. The Chinese managerial systems consisted of 
“Challenging targets in the medium-long range” due to long-term 
orientation and low level of uncertainty avoidance that characterize 
Chinese culture, unlike the Italians who prefer structured planning in 
order to define goals and implement accordingly to realize them. For 
Chinese, it is the “achievement of defined targets”, instead of “following 
the defined procedures”, that constitutes the object of control system and, 
then “looking for trust” as a mechanism to implement control system 
within the firm which takes a more informal way than structured way 
(Aureli & Demartini, 2010, p. 20). Talking about the HRM in Chinese 
subsidiaries, Miedtank (2017) has summarized her review of literature on 
Chinese HRM between 2001 and 2015, into three themes which portrays 
that Chinese companies, as opposed to MNCs of European countries: (i) 
have adopted a ‘light-touch’ or ‘hybrid’ approach toward managing their 
European subsidiaries; (ii) they continue to send abroad a large number of 
expats who are inexperienced resulting in a growing “unintended home- 
country effects”; and (iii) visible differences in HR practices and policies 
between privately owned and state owned Chinese companies. 
         As for the first basic difference in managing the subsidiaries, 
the adoption of ‘light-touch’ approach could be explained by the 
Chinese “long-term orientation” that fundamentally affects the choice 
of integration mode (Miedtank, 2017; Drahokoupil, 2017). As already 
mentioned in the previous sections, the dominant entry mode of 
Chinese firms into European economies is M&A, which is viewed as a 
long-run investment. Since they don’t expect immediate returns, they 
tend to adopt the ‘light integration’ also labelled as ‘light-touch 
approach’ or ‘partnering approach’ (Drahokoupil, 2017). Accordingly, 
the managers of Chinese MNCs rarely guide the HR management 
departments or decision-making processes of their subsidiaries in 
Europe, and this ‘passive’ managerial approach are attributed to the 
Chinese cultural influence known as ‘wu wei’, the concept of “active 
non-action” (Miedtank, 2017). 
         From the Chinese view point, such a management approach 
might be considered ‘desirable’ as professional organizations that have 
educated workforce need invisible leaders to empower employees and 
preserve harmony. Yet, as a study with regard to Chinese subsidiaries 
in Germany revealed, although local managers often exercise “high 
autonomy” in deciding on operational and sometimes strategic issues, 
final decision remains with the Chinese management (Miedtank, 2017). 
This is due mainly to high levels of personal authority and owner 
domination that underlies the authoritative and coordination control as 
a defining culture of the Chinese family business (Whitley, 1991). It is 
apparent in the literature that principles of Chinese family enterprise 
are used as an advantage to better adapt to conditions of uncertainty, 
and hence, they are not concerned to establish solid international 
management structures, but rather quickly develop flexible structures 
spanning diverse countries and markets (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008). 
Besides, the frequent sending, to Europe, of Chinese expats that have 
limited knowledge of host countries, lack international experience, low 
international management skills, and without adequate cross-cultural 
trainings has already created, what Miedtank (2017) termed as 
“unintended rather than intentional home-country effects”. It appears 
that Chinese companies do not to engage in a purposeful transfer of 
HRM skills and practices which are conventionally regarded as crucial 
variable for the business success in overseas subsidiaries, instead they 
are heavily involved in “unintended transfer of a Chinese mind-set to 
Europe” (Miedtank, 2017, p. 86). 
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The Chinese home-country effects manifest themselves in the implicit 
form of the transfer of management values, such as overlooking the 
strategic importance of HRM and some unrealistic expectations like 
“hard work” in the workplace (Miedtank, 2017). The Chinese expatriate 
managers are also easily challenged by local staff with superior 
knowledge and expertise (Miedtank, 2017). 
         As Aureli & Demartini (2010) noted, limited or ad-hoc training 
is provided for Chinese expatriates in Europe focusing on cross-cultural 
issues but lacks a long-term (pre-departure and post-departure) 
systematic component of development planning and management 
processes. To this effect, the “lack of managerial talent” in Chinese 
firms has become the biggest obstacle to their overseas expansion, as 
overwhelming majority of the Chinese executives verified, in one 
survey that covered 150 MNCs, that “their globalization efforts were 
hindered by the scarcity of people with real cross-cultural knowledge or 
experience managing foreign talent” (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008, p. 
29). 
Studies have revealed that State-owned companies and private 
companies face different regulatory and institutional environments. 
While Chinese private businesses are generally flexible and were able 
to adopt HR values and practices of the host countries, the SOE have 
been reported to be highly centralized, complex and prone to 
government intervention, and highly influenced by HR practices and 
policies of the home institutions (Miedtank, 2017; Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Drahokoupil, 2017). Private companies, after expanding to Europe 
through social networks, tend work with host country institutions to 
enhance their HR practices than replicating Chinese employment 
practices in order to advance in their future. However, the complexity 
of state-owned companies’ organizational structure in combination with 
communication difficulties can create complex problems between 
Chinese and European partners. 
         To sum it up, Chinese expatriate managers’ home-developed 
interpersonal and communication skills are therefore not readily 
transferable to different contexts, and in particular not to Western 
Europe (Miedtank, 2017). As Nocholas and Thomson rightly put it 
Chinese firms will continue to suffer from the drawbacks of their “path 
dependency”. 
CONCLUSION 
      In this paper, an attempt has been made to present the process of 
Chinese outward direct investment in Europe. From the discussion 
based on the review of literature, it has been noted that the Chinese 
business expansion abroad is a recent phenomenon, which became 
meaningful only in the last decade when China has recently become a 
net exporter of capital. A remarkable feature of the Chinese cross- 
border business expansion is the essential role of government in the 
internationalization of Chinese MNCs which was supported by 
official policy instruments, including the famous “go global” strategy 
that encouraged thousands of Chinese firms to invest abroad. 
Literature on the subject also shows that the driving motive of 
Chinese firms to go abroad aimed at acquiring new skills, advanced 
technology, brands and supply chains that would enhance their 
competitive advantage in international as well as domestic markets. 
To this end, the Chinese OFDI in Europe has generally targeted few 
but major economies, namely Germany, UK and France despite the 
investment growth in Southern and Central European nations in recent 
years especially after the financial crisis. Merger and acquisitions has 
been the leading market entry mode resulting in huge takeovers 
characterizing Chinese investment in Europe. 
      Although the involvement of the private companies has grown 
rapidly in the last few years, the Chinese outward foreign direct 
investment in Europe still continue to be dominated by state owned 
(and/or backed) corporations that have managed to takeover numerous 
firms in Europe. These acquisitions of Chinese SOEs in European 
countries, labeled by Hellström (2016) as “divestment of strategic 
assets”, has brought concerns as to whether the Chinese investments 
have political motives, that Nicolas & Thomsen (2008) believe will 
continue to “fuel conspiracy theories in the West”. 
      It is also apparent that the internationalization process of Chinese 
business companies did not follow the traditional Uppsala model as 
psychic distance and experiential knowledge didn’t play a role. 
Studies, instead, reveal that Resource Based View (RBV) and network 
perspectives could better explain the cross border expansion of 
Chinese firms as the role of resources as both as a means (e.g. 
utilization of networks) and objective (e.g. acquisition of assets) of 
internationalization process was eminent. The internationalization of 
“Dragon MNCs”, as they are sometimes called, witnessed not an 
incremental process but one of rapid and loosely structured expansion 
which depicting somehow what some regarded as “Asian century”. 
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         Nevertheless, it is evident that the path-dependency of Chinese 
expatriates in European countries has made it difficult to learn and adapt to 
the local work environment that exhibits diverging and contrasting cultural 
values. This huge cross-cultural gap, often portrayed in the literature as 
“culture conflict”, constitutes the biggest challenge that Chinese companies 
face, in their international operations in general, and could undermine their 
effectiveness in doing business in European countries in particular. 
         Given the current pace of internationalization and Chinese 
continuing appetite for investments abroad, targeting particularly Europe, 
the basic question remains if the Chinese firms could meet the necessary 
organizational and managerial skills to lead and coordinate their rapidly 
expanding global operations. Therefore, long-term cross-cultural training 
programmes in pre-departure and post-departure are essential for Chinese 
expatriates in Europe to positively interact with worker, managers and 
other local stakeholders in such a way to successfully integrate to the work 
environment in the subsidiaries. Only then, investment brings meaningful 
results that can benefit both home and host countries, which in turn would 
not only guarantee the survival but also sustained development of the 
Chinese MNCs in the future. 
REFERENCES 
Aharoni, Y., Tihanyi, L., & Connelly, B. L. (2011). Managerial Decision- 
        making in International Business: A Forty-Five-Year 
        Retrospective. Journal of World Business, 46, 135-142. 
Amendolagine, V., & Rabellotti, R. (2017). Chinese Foreign Direct 
        Investments in the European Union. In J. D. (Ed.), Chinese 
        Investment in Europe: Corporate Strategies and Labour Relations 
        (pp. 100-119). Brussels : ETUI aisbl. 
Aureli, S., & Demartini, P. (2010, October). Internationalization of Chinese 
        Firms in Europe: The Role of Cultural Differences in The 
        Functioning of M&A in The Automotive Industry. Quaderni di 
        Economia Aziendale, No. 13. Bepress. 
Barney, J. (1991). Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. 
        Journal of Management. 
Bian, S., & Emons, O. (2017). Chinese Investments in Germany: 
        Increasing in Line with Chinese Industrial Policy. In J. D. (Ed.), 
        Chinese Investment in Europe: Corporate Strategies and Labour 
        Relations (pp. 157-177). Brussels: ETUI aisbl. 
Blomkvist, K., & Drogendijk, R. (2016). Chinese outward foreign direct 
        investments in Europe. European J. International Management, 
        Vol. 10, No. 3, 343-358. 
Vol. 9 No. 4 
November 2018 
617 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. (1998). Analyzing Foreign Market Entry 
        Strategies: Extending the Internalization Approach. Journal of 
        International Business Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 539-562. 
Clegg, J., & Voss, H. (2012). Chinese Overseas Direct Investment in the 
        European Union. London: Europe China Research and Advice 
        Network. 
Dawei, G. (2008). Internationalization and Entry Strategy of Enterprises: 
        A Case Study of Chinese Firm: Huawei . Dissertation for Master 
        Degree in International Marketing, School of Business and 
        Engineering, University of Halmstad. 
Dekeyser, H. (2017). Chinese Investments in Europe: Bargain Hunt or 
        Salvation for The European Economy? Masterproef voorgelegd 
        voor het behalen van de graad master in de richting Politieke 
        Wetenschappen afstudeerrichting Internationale Politiek. 
Drahokoupil, J. (2017). Introduction. In J. D. (Ed.), Chinese Investment in 
        Europe: Corporate Strategies and Labour Relations (pp. 1-17). 
        Brussels: ETUI aisbl. 
Dreger, C., Schüler-Zhou, Y., & Schüller, M. (2017, April 15). Chinese 
        Foreign Direct Investment in Europe. Deutsches Institut für 
        Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Economic Bulletin, 14-15, pp. 155- 
        160. 
Ebbers, H., & Zhang, J. (2010). Chinese Investments in the EU. Eastern 
        Journal of European Studies, Volume 1, Issue 2, 187-206. 
EUCCC. (2013). Chinese outbound Investment in the European Union. 
        European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. 
Gilpin, R. (2001). GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: Understanding 
        The International Economic Order. Princeton: Princeton 
        University Press. 
Guerrero, D. (2017). Chinese Investment in Europe in the Age of Brexit 
        and Trump. Transnational Institute (TNI), Working Papers. 
Hanemann, T., & Rosen, D. H. (2012). China Invests in Europe Patterns, 
        Impacts and Policy Implications. RHODIUM GROUP. 
Hellström, J. (2016). China’s Acquisitions in Europe: European 
        Perceptions of Chinese Investments and their Strategic 
        Implications. FOI. 
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, 
        Behaviours, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations, 2nd 
        Ed. Sage Publications. 
 Vol. 9 No. 4 
November 2018 
618 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. E. (1977). The Internationalization Process of the 
        Firm: A Model of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign 
        Market Commitments. Journal of International Business Studies, 8, 
        23–32. 
Kessler, E., Prandini, M., & Wu, J. (2014). Chinese Companies in 
        Switzerland. Central European Business Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 23- 
        30. 
Luo, Y., & Tung, R. L. (2007). International Expansion of Emerging Market 
        Enterprises: A Springboard Perspective. Journal of International 
        Business Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4, 481–498. 
Miedtank, T. (2017). International human resource management and 
        employment relations of Chinese MNCs. 
Nicolas, F., & Thomsen, S. (2008). The Rise of Chinese Firms in Europe: 
        Motives, Strategies and Implications . The Asia Pacific Economic 
        Association Conference, (pp. 1-42). Beijing, December 13 – 14, 
        2008. 
Parmentola, A. (2010). The Internationalization of Chinese Companies: Are 
        the Traditional Resource Based Theories Valid Yet? Review of 
        International Comparative Management, Vol. 11, No. 2, 260-275. 
Rabellotti, R. (2017, July 10 Accessed on July 24/2018 @19:15). How good 
        is investing in Europe for Chinese Companies? Retrieved from The 
        Asia Dialogue: http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/07/10/how-good-is- 
        investing-in-europe-for-chinese-companies/ 
Tartar, A., Rojanasakul, M., & Diamond, J. S. (2018, April 23). How China 
        Is Buying Its Way Into Europe. Retrieved from Bloomberg Web 
        Page: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-china-business-in- 
        europe/ accessed 29/07/2018 at 5:36 PM 
UKEssays.(2015).UKEssays.Retrievedfrom 
        https://www.ukessays.com/essays/economics/case-study-of- 
        huaweis-internationalization-economics-essay.php?vref=1 
Whitley, R. D. (1991). The Social Construction of Business Systems in East 
        Asia. Organization Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1-28. 
